When “Enough” Isn’t Enough: Re-Thinking Fairness for Disabled Children in B.C. Estates After Wols v. Funk

British Columbia law gives individuals significant freedom to decide how their estate will be distributed on death. That freedom, however, is not absolute. Where a will fails to make adequate provision for a spouse or child, the court may intervene under the Wills, Estates and Succession Act (“WESA”).

The 2026 decision in Wols v. Funk, 2026 BCSC 404 illustrates how that intervention operates where the claimant is an adult child living with significant disabilities. It also highlights an important distinction: providing for basic needs is not the same as making adequate, just and equitable provision.

A Will That Prioritized Others

George Wols died in 2021, leaving behind his only child, Gerry. Gerry, who was in his 60s at the time of trial, has lived his entire life with serious cognitive and developmental disabilities. He has never been capable of managing his own affairs or living independently and resides in a care setting supported by government benefits.

Under George’s will, Gerry was to receive roughly 25% of the estate, while the remaining 75% was left to Mary and Ewald Funk. The estate itself was modest, valued at approximately $490,000, and the will did not provide any explanation for this distribution.

The Funks were not family members. Their relationship with George began through paid housekeeping services and developed into a personal connection over time. They assisted George in various ways as he aged, and the court accepted that they were important figures in his life. Still, the central issue was not their role. The issue was whether the provision made for Gerry met the standard required by law.

What Counts as “Adequate”?

The legal framework governing this analysis comes from Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate. Courts must determine what a “judicious parent” would have done in the circumstances, measured against contemporary societal norms. Testamentary autonomy is a relevant consideration, but it must yield where a will falls short of a will-maker’s legal and moral obligations.

This is an objective test. The court is not concerned with whether George believed he had done enough, but whether the outcome reflects what society expects of a reasonable parent in his position.

Why the Court Intervened

The court had little difficulty concluding that the will did not meet that standard. Gerry’s circumstances were central to that finding. His disabilities were lifelong and significant, leaving him entirely dependent on others for care and support. As he aged, his needs had increased, not diminished. In these circumstances, the moral obligation owed to him was at its highest.

Although Gerry’s basic needs, such as food, shelter, and medical care, were being met through public funding, the evidence showed that his quality of life was limited. He lacked access to relatively modest supports that could have meaningfully improved his day-to-day experience, including appropriate clothing, more frequent outings, and individualized attention. The court emphasized that WESA is not concerned with subsistence alone. Adequate provision includes dignity, comfort, and the opportunity for a fuller life.

The absence of competing claims also weighed heavily in the analysis. While the Funks were supportive and involved, the law does not recognize moral obligations to non-spouses or non-children in this context. Their contributions could justify some provision, but they could not outweigh the obligation owed to Gerry.

Finally, the lack of any stated rationale in the will for limiting Gerry’s share undermined the defence. Without an explanation, the court had little basis to defer to George’s choices, particularly where those choices produced an outcome that fell below what would be expected of a judicious parent.

The Result: A Significant Rebalancing

The court ultimately varied the will in a substantial way. Gerry’s share of the estate was increased to 80%, with the remaining 20% left to the Funks. In doing so, the court recognized George’s connection with the Funks, but made clear that this could not come at the expense of his primary obligation to his son.

The result reflects the balance at the heart of WESA: testamentary autonomy is respected, but only to the extent that it aligns with what is adequate, just and equitable in the circumstances.

What This Decision Signals

Wols v. Funk reinforces several key principles that continue to shape wills variation claims in British Columbia. Courts will not treat government benefits as a substitute for meaningful provision from a parent. A child’s entitlement is not measured at a subsistence level, particularly where that child lives with significant disabilities.

The decision also underscores that moral obligations under WESA are narrowly defined. While friends, caregivers, and other non-family beneficiaries may be deserving in a general sense, they do not carry legal weight when measured against the claims of a spouse or child.

More broadly, the case serves as a reminder that fairness in this context is not minimal. It is not enough that a vulnerable child can get by. The law asks whether they have been provided for in a way that reflects dignity, security, and a reasonable quality of life.

For will-makers and drafting solicitors, the message is clear. Where an adult child has ongoing vulnerabilities, particularly disabilities, a will that leaves them with a limited share, especially in favour of non-family beneficiaries, faces a significant risk of being varied.